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Bankruptcy's Rarity: An Essay on
Small Business Bankruptcy in the United States
by
EDWARD

R. MORRISON*"

Most nations have enacted statutes governing business liquidation and reorganization. These statutes are the primary focus when policymakers and
scholars discuss ways to improve laws governing business failure. This focus is
misplaced, at leastfor distressedsmall businesses in the United States.
Evidence from a major credit bureau shows that over eighty percent of these
businesses liquidate or reorganize without invoking the formal Bankruptcy
Code.
The businesses instead invoke procedures derivedfrom the laws of contracts,
secured lending,and trusts. These procedures can be cheaperand speedier than
a formal bankruptcy filing, but they typically require unanimous consent of
senior, secured lenders. This essay identifies the conditions under which a
business owner is able to obtain lender consent. The empiricalfindings point
to an important balance between a nation's formal insolvency statutes and
alternative modes of liquidationand reorganization.This balance, the essay
argues, shouldplay a central role in any discussion of insolvency-law reform.

ECFR 2008, 172-188
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L Introduction
Few small businesses in the United States invoke the Federal Bankruptcy
Code to reorganize or liquidate. For every one hundred that fail, at most
20 file a petition under the federal bankruptcy law. What explains the rarity of
small-business bankruptcy filings in the United States? Are they rare because,
for most businesses, less expensive alternatives are available under state law?
If so, what makes these alternatives less expensive to some businesses and not
others?
I explore these questions in this short essay. They have been the focus of my
work, and the work of colleagues, during the past few years.1 The questions
are relevant to an international symposium such as this because they highlight a dynamic present in any legal system that regulates insolvency. In every
nation, failing businesses have options. One is a proceeding under national
bankruptcy codes. Another is an agreement or "workout" among creditors.
Another may be the law of secured transactions, which allows creditors to
seize assets of a troubled business. There may be many other options, depending on the legal system. A business's choice among these "distress options"
will depend on internal and external factors. The primary internal factor is
capital structure - that is, the composition of debts relative to assets. Some
options are better suited to businesses with complicated capital structures.
External factors are important as well. Some distress options are more expensive than others because they require greater court involvement, more extensive documentation, or more probing investigation by creditors.
A nation's formal bankruptcy code, then, is only one part - perhaps a small
part - of the overall set of laws governing the resolution of distress in small
businesses. This observation has three implications.
First, when a nation reforms its bankruptcy codes, it should anticipate several
different responses. Reform will undoubtedly affect the administration and
outcomes of cases commenced under the code. At the same time, reform will
alter the attractiveness of the code relative to alternative modes of liquidation
and reorganization. If reform increases the costs of proceedings under the
insolvency code, businesses and their creditors will find it more attractive to
1 See Edward R. Morrison, BargainingAround Bankruptcy: Small Business Distress and
State Law, J. Legal Stvd. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Morrison, Bargaining Around
Bankruptcy]; Edward R. Morrison, "Small Business Bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy

Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005," A Report to the United States Small
Business Administration (2007) [hereinafter Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy];
Ronald J. Mann, An EmpiricalInvestigation of Liquidation Choices of FailedHigh-Tech
Firms, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1375 (2004).
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restructure debts voluntarily, perhaps through a "workout." Alternatively,
businesses and creditors may find it more attractive to liquidate or auction off
the business using the ordinary remedies available to creditors - a foreclosure, or a lawsuit followed by a foreclosure. As businesses and their creditors gravitate toward these distress options, the effects of bankruptcy reform
will be dampened, because fewer businesses will be using the bankruptcy
code. And there will be another dampening effect: if the code becomes highly
unattractive, businesses will adjust their capital structures to reduce the need
for the code. A business with only a handful of major creditors can more
easily reach a "workout" than one with a wide range of creditors.
This complexity points to a second implication: bankruptcy law has a limited
role to play in the distress of small businesses. It offers a mechanism for resolving distress when the business and its creditors cannot resolve it on their
own. But in a surprisingly large number of small business cases, they are in
fact able to resolve it on their own. Thus, when we think about the appropriate design of bankruptcy law, we need to ask: What kinds of firms need
this kind of law? My research suggests that it may be needed by relatively
large firms that have multiple senior lenders. It may also be needed by firms
that have lost the trust of their creditors, who suspect that the owners have
been hiding information.
This leads to a final implication: empirical research is essential to any effort to
reform bankruptcy codes. Once we identify the kinds of businesses that need
a bankruptcy code, we need to watch their behavior when the code is
reformed. If the code becomes too costly or cumbersome, these businesses
will "vote with their feet" and use alternatives, even if the alternatives have
their own disadvantages. By watching the behavior of businesses, we can
determine when bankruptcy reforms work well and when they do not.
The remainder of this essay will present a series of figures, drawn from prior
work. My goal is to establish three points: (1) federal bankruptcy filings are
uncommon in the United States, (2) the attractiveness of the federal code
depends on the complexity of a firm's capital structure, the firm's relationship
with senior lenders, and the laws governing alternative insolvency procedures, and (3) there is still great uncertainty surrounding the reasons why
some firms do and most do not use federal bankruptcy law.
I.

The rarity of bankruptcyfilings

Figure 1 presents the central observation of this essay: the rarity of federal
bankruptcy filings in the United States. This figure draws on nation-wide
small-business data collected during the years 2004 and 2006 by Dun & Brad-
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street (D & B), a credit-reporting bureau.2 D & B gathers detailed information about any business that has borrowed or may soon borrow money from
a bank or trade vendor. D & B records cover about seventy-three percent of
all U.S. businesses. The data underlying Figure 1 are a random sample of
D & B records in 2004 and 2006. Figure 1 shows that federal bankruptcy
filings account for only three to four percent of all business closures. When
the definition of "closure" is narrowed to include only businesses that closed
at a point in time when they were financially distressed,3 the percentage rises
to around twenty percent among corporations and thirteen percent among
non-corporate entities.

22%
20%

15%

13%
10%

10%

5%

%3%

3%

39%

0%
2004

2004
Corporations

I mAll Business Closures

2006

Non-Corporations
o Distressed Business Closures I

Figure 1. Federal Bankruptcy Filings Expressed as a Percentage of Business Closures During
2004 and 2006.

III. Bargainingaround bankruptcy: internaland externalfactors
Why are bankruptcy filings rare in the United States? Standard texts portray
federal bankruptcy law as a near-inevitable choice of a distressed business.4
2 These data are described in Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 18-23.
3 A business was coded as "financially distressed if it received a high "financial stress
score" under D&B's proprietory scoring methodology. Information abort this methodology is available in Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 25.
4 See, e.g., BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY:
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Once it becomes distressed, the business faces a group of uncooperative
creditors, each of whom is rushing to be the first to bring suit and foreclose
on assets. This race is costly because it generates duplicative collection
efforts. It is also wasteful because these collection efforts could lead to dismemberment of a viable business. Faced with a destructive race among creditors, the business will invoke the protection of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code, which stays all creditor collection efforts and gives the business time to
sort out its affairs and conduct an orderly liquidation or reorganization. Yet,
we see just the opposite in practice: most distressed businesses never file for
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is far from inevitable - it is exceptional. Why? This
section proposes several theories and offers evidence consistent with each.
The evidence is drawn from D & B data on distressed small businesses that
either filed a federal bankruptcy petition ("bankruptcies") or shut down
without filing a petition ("nonbankruptcy closures") during calendar years
2004 and 2006.1 With one exception, noted in subsection C, the data are a random sample of D & B records for distressed small businesses in throughout
6
the United States.
1. Capitalstructure
Begin first with the uncontroversial observation that bankruptcy proceedings
are expensive. Among small businesses with assets worth less than $ 1 million, 7 the median firm incurs professional fees and other direct bankruptcy
costs that consume at least five percent of asset value.8 Among businesses
with assets worth less than $100,000, direct costs burn twenty-three percent
of asset value. The costliness of federal bankruptcy law induces distressed
businesses to search for cheaper alternatives. In the United States and elseand MATERIALS 1-3 (Foundation Press 4 ,h ed. 2007); THOMAS H. JACK7-19 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
A business was deemed "small" if it satisfied the definition of a "small business" set out
by the U.S. Small Business Administration. This definition tends to capture businesses
with fewer than 500 employees (among manufacturing concerns) or less than $ 6.5 million in annual sales (among other businesses).
Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 18-23 (describing the process by
which these data were gathered).
The median small business, in or out of bankruptcy, is actually much smaller, with assets
ranging between $100,000 and $ 350,000. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision
Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 50
J. L. & Econ. 381, 386-87 (2007). I use a $ 1 million cut-off because it is also used by
Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter7 Liquidation
versus Chapter11 Reorganization,61 J. Fin. 1253, 1282 (2006).
See Bris, et al., supra note 7, at 1282.
CASES, PROBLEMS,

SON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

5

6
7

8
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where, there are many alternatives. 9 Some are contractual - the business could
reach a consensual workout agreement with its creditors.' 0 Some are based on
trust law - the business could assign its assets to a trustee, who will auction
them off and distribute the proceeds to creditors. In the United States, that
procedure is called an "assignment for the benefit of creditors." Other procedures are based on the law of secured transactions - the business could permit
a secured lender to foreclose on assets. This is called a "friendly foreclosure."
Whatever the legal procedure, there are many alternatives to a formal, federal
bankruptcy filing. And these alternatives may be cheaper than a federal filing.
To whom will they be cheaper? They will often be cheaper to businesses with
simple capital structures, that is, businesses with a small number of lenders,
each of whom holds a claim with well-defined priority. The smaller the number of lenders, the lower the cost of coordination. It is well known that coordination costs - and the risk that a creditor will hold up the bargaining process in order to extract a greater payoff - tend to fall as the number of
creditors shrinks in size." Coordination is essential because, unlike a federal
bankruptcy case, state-law procedures generally do not halt creditors from
pursuing collection efforts. There is, in other words, no "automatic stay" outside federal bankruptcy court.
But it is unnecessary for the total number of creditors to be small. 12 All that is
necessary is that the number of senior lenders be relatively small. By senior,
I mean creditors with security interests or large unsecured claims. Because
their claims are relatively large, these creditors have strong incentives to
monitor the business and demand a payout from any procedure that resolves
distress. These creditors should be contrasted with junior creditors, such as
trade vendors, who have such small claims that they will rarely if ever monitor the debtor or participate in an insolvency proceeding. Because they are
silent participants and because their claims are small, junior creditors are
often ignored when a business takes steps to resolve its distress.
To be sure, junior creditors can disrupt efforts to resolve distress in or outside
federal bankruptcy court. 3 But they rarely do so. Even if they do, dissent can
9 For a convenient, brief summary of these alternatives, see James A. Chatz & Joy E.
Levy, Alternatives to Bankruptcy, 17 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 5 (2008).
10 Workouts and other alternatives are described in Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1.
11 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 44-45 (1965); George
J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. 359, 360-62 (1974).
12 Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 10-12.
13 They can, for example, commence an involuntary bankruptcy case and thereby force
a business to use the Federal Bankruptcy Code. To do this however, the creditors
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be quelled. A relatively small payment may convince junior creditors that
they should not object to whatever procedure the firm and its senior creditors have chosen. 14 Additionally, there are procedures under state laws - such
as an assignment for the benefit of creditors 5 - which can be implemented
without consent from or payment to junior creditors.
This theory finds strong support in the D & B data, as Figures 2 and 3 show.
In these and the remaining figures, solid black bars measure the characteristics of firms that filed federal bankruptcy petitions ("bankruptcies"); white
bars measure businesses that closed without filing for bankruptcy ("closures"). If the difference between bankruptcies and closures is statistically significant at the five percent level, the bar for "closures" is grey and crosshatched instead of solid white. Here, and throughout this essay, patterns that
are statistically significant in the figures are also statistically significant in
multivariate logit models, details of which can be found in my other work.16
Recall that corporations are twice as likely to file a federal bankruptcy petition as non-corporate entities. Figure 2 shows that corporations also have
significantly more complicated capital structures than non-corporate entities.
80%
70%
60%

40%

....................... .corps
------..----.-..

0 Noncorps

30%
20%
10%
0%

.,

Figure 2. Capital Structure of Corporations and Non-Corporate Entities that Closed or Filed
for Bankruptcy during 2004, 2006. Each bar indicates the percentage of business with a particular
characteristic.

generally most form a group of three or more clainants -whose unsecured claims, together, aggregate to at lenst a $ 13.475. See II U.S.C. S 303.
14 This observation is based on interviews with anonymous Illinois attorneys.
15 See Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 10-12.
16 Id.; Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy, supra note 1.
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Figure 3. Capital Structure of Corporations that Closed or Filed a Bankruptcy Petition during
2004, 2006. Each bar indicates the percentage of businesses with a particular characteristic.

Even when we focus exclusively on corporations, as Figure 3 does, we see
that corporations that file for bankruptcy have more complicated capital
structures than those that use alternative procedures. We would see exactly
the same pattern if we focused on non-corporate entities: businesses in bankruptcy have significantly more complicated capital structures than those that
use state - law alternatives. These observations are consistent with the hypothesis that distressed businesses turn to federal bankruptcy law when they
face a large number of senior lenders, each of whom can hold up alternative
procedures under state law.
2. Business size
Another important factor is size. The larger the business, as measured in
terms of assets, the greater the potential distribution to creditors, especially
lenders with secured claims. 17 All else equal, a secured lender with a claim
equal to, say, $1 million will have stronger incentive to monitor and bring
suit against a large business than a small one. In some respects, the point here
is similar to the one made about capital structure complexity: the larger the
business, the more likely it will face aggressive creditors and be unable to
reach agreement without filing a federal bankruptcy case. Indeed, larger
businesses tend to have more complicated capital structures.
17 This argument is developed in Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 13.
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This theory - that larger businesses are more likely to use federal law - also
finds support in the data. Figure 4 shows that corporations are older, have
greater annual sales, more lines of business (as measured by Standard Indus25.0 ,,

150.0

MNoncorps
10.0-

5.0

0.0

Firm age (yrs)

Management
tenure (yrs)

Annual sales
(100,0O0s)

Firms with
multiple SIC
codes ()

Employment at
Site (no. of
employees)

Figure 4. Proxies for Firm Size among Corporations and Non-Corporate Entities that Closed
or Filed a Bankruptcy Petition during 2004, 2006. Each bar indicates the percentage of businesses
with a particular characteristic.
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Figure 5. Proxies for Firm Size among Corporations that Closed or Filed a Bankruptcy Petition
during 2004, 2006. Each bar indicates the percentage of businesses with a particular characteristic.
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trial Classification (SIC) codes), and more employees than non-corporate
entities which are less likely to invoke federal bankruptcy law. Each of these
variables is a direct or indirect measure of business size, and all of them indicate that corporations are much larger than their non-corporate counterparts.
Figure 5 digs deeper, comparing bankruptcies to closures. The same pattern
emerges: among corporations as well as non-corporate entities, businesses in
bankruptcy are significantly larger than those that resolve distress using alternative state-law procedures.

3. Relationshipswith creditors
Even if a business has a simple capital structure, it may still find federal law

attractive. A workout or other non-bankruptcy procedure will not succeed
unless senior lenders trust the business's disclosures or can verify them at
reasonable cost. These disclosures include information about the value of assets, the reasons for financial distress, and prospects for recovery. There is
little use in permitting a small business to reorganize if it is destined to fail
again, or if the owner is stealing from it. If lenders worry about these things,
they can audit the business. But audits are costly and, if multiple creditors demand independent audits, the debtor may prefer to file a federal bankruptcy
petition. When creditors pursue their own audits, non-bankruptcy procedures may become just as cumbersome and costly as a federal bankruptcy case. 8
It is difficult, of course, to know precisely when a creditor mistrusts a business's owner. There are, however, proxies. One is whether the business has
defaulted on senior debt or been habitually late in payments. This kind of behavior damages the business's relationship with the senior lender, which may
lead the lender to be skeptical about the owner-manager's reports. 9 Using
this measure as a proxy for creditor mistrust, the data show that mistrust is
more prevalent among business in bankruptcy than among those that invoke
state-law alternatives. Figures 2 and 3 show that businesses in bankruptcy are
more likely to be late or have defaulted on large trade debts, which are defin20
ed as large liabilities owed to suppliers of goods or services.
18 This argument is developed in Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1,
at 16-19, 41-44.
19 A large literature documents the importance of "relationship-based lending" among
small businesses. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger & Gregory E Udell, Relationship Lending
andLines of Credit in Small Firm Finance, 68 J. Bus. 351 (1995); Mitchell A. Petersen &
Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Firm-CreditorRelationships: Evidence from Small
Business Data, 49 J. Fin. 3 (1994).
20 This definition may seem counter-intuitive. For the typical firm, most trade debts are
small (perhaps $100) liabilities owed to suppliers. D&B, however, records information
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Figure 6. Proxies for the Quality of Lender-Borrow Relations among Corporations that were
Located in Cook Country, Illinois, and Closed or Filed a Bankruptcy Petition between 1998 and
2005. Each bar indicates the percentage of corporations with a particular characteristic.

Similarly, Figure 6 shows that, among small corporations, businesses in bankruptcy are significantly more likely to have defaulted on secured debt. The
data underlying this figure differ from those underlying other figures in this
essay. Figure 6 summarizes the characteristics of small corporations that were
located in Cook County, Illinois, suffered distress between 1998 and 2000,
and then filed a federal bankruptcy petition or shut down without filing a
petition before 2005.21 These geographic and temporal limitations were necessary because comparable information - about defaults on secured debt was unavailable in the nationally-representative sample used in the rest of this
essay.
I view these patterns as evidence that businesses in bankruptcy have worse
relationships with their creditors than businesses that invoke state-law alternatives. There is an alternative interpretation, of course: businesses in bankruptcy are more distressed (as evidenced by the relatively large number of defaults) than those using state-law alternatives. Although I cannot rule out this
interpretation, I do not think it is a complete explanation for the patterns in
Figures 2, 3, and 6. These figures compare distressed businesses that filed for
bankruptcy to distressed businesses that used alternative procedures. Distress
about trade debts only when a creditor reports information to the credit bureau. Creditors report this information only when they have relatively large claims. For this reason, when D&B reports that a business is late in paying or has defaulted on trade debt,
I assume that the business is late in paying or has defaulted on large trade debts.
21 These data are described in Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at.
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was measured using D&B's proprietary "financial stress score. "22 Assuming
this scoring system is an accurate measure of distress, Figures 2, 3, and 6 are
comparing two groups that are, on average, equally distressed. Though they
are equally distressed, one group - businesses in bankruptcy - are significantly more likely to have defaulted on or been late in paying secured debts
and large trade debts. This, I believe, is evidence that creditor-debtor relationships are worse among businesses in bankruptcy.
4. Non-bankruptcy law
The level of trust between a business and its senior lenders may depend on
the law. In particular, laws governing non-bankruptcy alternatives may affect
a lender's willingness to consent to these alternatives. These laws vary significantly across the states. 23 Some, such as Florida, New York, and Texas, have
adopted fairly comprehensive regulations that give courts authority to oversee insolvency proceedings and give lenders rights to sue insiders or other
creditors who received favorable treatment by the business as it sank into
distress. Other states give businesses a much freer hand in resolving distress.
In states such as Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, and Oregon, no statute regulates the process. It is instead governed by state common law, which imposes
relatively few burdens on insolvent debtors. Courts are not directly involved
in the insolvency process; creditors have limited power to bring suit against
24
favored insiders or other creditors.
Variation in state law - greater regulation in some states than others - will
affect a small business's choice between federal bankruptcy law and state-law
alternatives. First, state-law alternatives will be more expensive in states with
relatively rigorous regulation. Court fees and other legal costs, for example,
will be paid in states with judicial oversight. If these costs exceed the expense
of a federal bankruptcy filing, a distressed business will invoke federal law.
Thus, distressed small businesses may be more likely to file federal bankruptcy petitions in states with vigorous regulations.
Vigorous regulations could, however, have the opposite effect. Suppose the
costs of these regulations are less than the expense of a federal bankruptcy
case, as they are generally thought to be for many small businesses.2 Then the
22 See Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 23.
23 For detailed discussion of these laws, see id., at 17-20.
24 These interstate differences are discussed and summarized in tabular form in id., at
10-14, 16-19, and Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 14-16.
25 See, e.g., Malanie Rovner Cohen & Joanna L. Challacombe, Assignment for the Benefit
of Creditors- ContemporaryAlternativesfor Corporations,2 DePaul Bus. L. J.269, 270
(1990) ("In contrast to a Chapter 7 liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code, an assign-
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regulations may be attractive to senior lenders because they give the lenders
broad power to audit the distressed business and attack various forms of selfdealing. 26 Suppose, for example, that the business repaid loans from insiders,
to the disadvantage of third-party creditors, while it was distressed. If the
business has filed a federal bankruptcy petition, creditors can recover these
"preferential transfers" from the insiders.2 7 But if the business is pursuing
non-bankruptcy alternatives under state law, creditors can recover the "preferential transfers" only if the state has adopted section 5(b) of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). 21 As of this writing, it has been adopted in
thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia. 29 In these states, then, lenders
have relatively strong power to audit distressed businesses and unwind selfdealing by insiders. If this power is valuable to senior lenders, they will be
more likely to permit a business to use non-bankruptcy alternatives in states
that have adopted section 5(b) than in those that have not adopted it. Federal
bankruptcy law, then, could be less popular (and state-law alternatives more
popular) in states that heavily regulate their non-bankruptcy alternatives just the opposite effect from the one predicted in the preceding paragraph.
There is mixed evidence suggesting that state regulations do in fact make nonbankruptcy alternatives more attractive. In related work, I compare states
with high and low bankruptcy filing rates, which I define as the number of
bankruptcy filings for every hundred failed businesses. I find that bankruptcy
filing rates are lower in states with strict regulations." This is consistent with
the hypothesis that creditors (and debtors) are more likely to use a state's insolvency procedures, instead of federal bankruptcy law, when the laws of that
state promote transparency in the insolvency procedures.

26
27
28

29

30

ment is generally more efficient, less costly, of shorter duration, more successful in
terms of the value received for the assts and amounts paid to creditors and more tailored to the needs of debtors and their creditors."); David S. Kupetz, Assignment for the
Benefit of Creditors:Advantageous Vehicle for Selling and Acquiring Distressed Enterprises, 6 J. Private Equity 16, 18 (2003) (same); Mann, supra note 1, at 1392-93 (same);
Bruce C. Scalambrino, Representing a Creditor in an Assignment for the Benefit of
Creditors,92 Ill. Bar J. 263 (2004) (same).
See Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 16-19.
11 U.S.C. 5 547(b).
Unif. Fraud. Transfer Act § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 129 (2006) ("A transfer made by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time,
and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.").
Forty-four states have adopted the UFTA in whole or in part. These states are listed
at <http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufta.asp>. In
Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 60-61, I identify the subset
of states that have adopted section 5(b).
See Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 36-37.
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The pattern, however, is tentative. In two separate papers, I explore the pattern using statistical methods. In one, I use a nationally representative sample
of distressed small businesses, drawn from D&B data.' I test whether the
terms of state law affect a business's choice between federal bankruptcy law and
state insolvency procedures. There appears to be no effect: among both corporations and non-corporations, a distressed small business is no more likely
to use non-bankruptcy procedures in states with comprehensive regulations
(e. g., New York) than in states with relatively lax regulations (e. g., Illinois).
The analysis in that paper, however, does not distinguish distressed small business seeking to reorganize from those planning to liquidate. State laws may
matter more for reorganizing businesses than for those that are liquidating.
Reorganizing businesses need creditor cooperation, and a creditor's willingness to cooperate may depend on existing law. If state law offers a transparent
insolvency procedure - which helps creditors assess whether insiders behaved badly and whether the business's prospects are good - creditors may
cooperate with a debtor seeking to reorganize via state insolvency procedures. Otherwise, creditors may refuse to cooperate unless the business files a
federal bankruptcy petition.
I test this hypothesis in a separate paper, which uses annual data on (i) business bankruptcy filings by state and chapter (Chapter 11 versus Chapter 7)
and (ii) total business failures by state.32 These data are published by the U.S.
federal government. I find that Federal Chapter 11 filings (generally used for
reorganization) are less common in states with broad laws regulating payments to insiders, such as section § (b) of the UFTA. Filings under Chapter 7
(used for liquidation) are uncorrelated with state law. This suggests that state
laws do matter when a business is reorganizing, but not when it is liquidating.
5. Otherfactors: remaining uncertainty
Other factors may affect the choice between federal bankruptcy law and state
alternatives. Gender, race, and ethnicity, for example, appear to matter, as
Figure 7 shows. Among proprietorships and partnerships, female-owned
businesses are more likely to avoid federal bankruptcy law than their maleowned counterparts. The same effect is observed among minority-owned
businesses, although the difference between minority-owned and non-minority-owned businesses is not statistically significant. Just the opposite pattern
is observed among corporations. Female-owned and minority-owned businesses are more likely to use federal law than their male-owned and nonminority-owned counterparts.
31 Morrison, Bargaining around Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 31-36.
32 Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 44-49.
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Figure 7. Other Characteristics of Corporations and Non-Corporate Entities. Each bar indicates the percentage of businesses with a particular characteristic.

These patterns could reflect discrimination in credit markets. Discrimination
against minority entrepreneurs is well-documented33 and could make federal
bankruptcy law more attractive to them than state-law alternatives, because it
offers a court-supervised opportunity to bargain with discriminatory creditors. This may explain why minority-owned corporations are more likely to
invoke federal law than non-minority-owned businesses. On the other hand,
minority- or woman-owned businesses may be relatively small, due to creditmarket discrimination that prevents them from exploiting growth opportunities. Due to their small size and limited resources, these businesses - when
they suffer distress - may be deterred by the relatively high cost of a federal
bankruptcy case and opt for cheaper non-bankruptcy alternatives instead.
This might explain why minority-owned proprietorships and partnerships
are less likely to use federal law than their non-minority-owned counter34

parts.

33 David G. Blanchflower, Phillip B. Levine, & David J. Zimmerman, Discriminationin
the Small-Bmsiness Credit Market, 85 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 930 (2003).
34 Dawsey and Ausubel find a similar pattern in their study of distressed consumers, who
can discharge debt by filing a federal bankruptcy filing or by forcing creditors to pursue
collection under state law. See Amanda E. Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, "Informal
Bankruptcy," SSRN working paper (Feb. 2002). Because many creditors will "charge
off" a debt instead of pursuing collection, Dawsey and Ausubel argue that distressed
consumers face a choice between "formal bankruptcy" (a federal filing) and "informal
bankruptcy" (placing the burden on creditors to assert state law remedies). The authors
find that members of minority groups are more likely than other borrowers to choose
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But it seems premature to view the patterns in Figure 7 as evidence of discrimination. Recent empirical work finds no evidence of credit market discrimination against female entrepreneurs,35 yet Figure 7 shows that the same
patterns characterize both minority-owned and female-owned firms. These
patterns may only highlight the remaining uncertainty surrounding the
reasons why some businesses find federal bankruptcy law attractive, but most
do not.
Additional evidence of this uncertainty comes from regression models in
which I predict the likelihood that a business files a federal bankruptcy petition.16 1 account for all of the factors listed in this essay, and many more. The
models, unfortunately, have modest preductive power. Among businesses
that actually did file federal bankruptcy petitions - that is businesses for
which a strong statistical model should predict a probability of filing for
bankruptcy equal to at least fifty percent - my models estimate a probability
of filing equal to only twenty-six percent. This tells us that, despite the importance of the various factors discussed above, there are many other factors
that affect a business's choice between the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and state
alternatives.
IV Conclusion
This sobering observation should not detract from the valuable information
contained in Figures 1 through 7. They point to an important balance in the
design of bankruptcy codes. In any legal system, there will be multiple ways
to resolve financial distress, ranging from a collective "workout" among creditors to a formal bankruptcy proceeding. Distressed businesses will choose
the procedure that offers the greatest return (to the owner and creditors) at
lowest cost. This choice will be driven by internal factors, including capital
structure, as well as external ones, such as formal differences between the
bankruptcy code and alternative procedures. As governments vary the design
of bankruptcy codes, they should be sensitive to the decision-making of
distressed businesses. Any reform in the code will have two effects. It will alter
outcomes among businesses that invoke the bankruptcy process. It will also
alter the attractiveness of the bankruptcy process relative to its alternatives.

informal bankruptcy. The authors do not, however, offer a theory that might explain
this pattern.
35 Arne L. Kalleberg & Kevin T. Leicht, Gender and OrganizationPerformance:Determinants of Small Business Survival and Success, 34 Acad. Mgmt. J. 136 (1991).
36 Morrison, Small Business Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 44-49.
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For example, bankruptcy-code reforms that expand protections for unsecured creditors, such as suppliers of raw materials, may only increase the incentive of debtors and secured creditors to pursue non-bankruptcy alternatives.
Of course, a business's decision-making process - its choice between the
bankruptcy code and alternatives - will depend on the range of available
alternatives. In the United States, the range is fairly broad. In other countries,
it may be broader or narrower. The findings in this paper point to an important benefit of a broad range of bankruptcy alternatives: the broader the
range, the better the fit between (i) the financial problems facing a particular
business and (ii) the legal mechanism for resolving those problems. In the
United States, we see small businesses sort themselves across legal mechanisms. Those with simple capital structures use relatively simple state-law
devices; larger, more complex small businesses invoke the relatively complex
Bankruptcy Code.
A tough question remains, however. It is one thing to say that a broad range
of legal options is a good idea, but it is quite another thing to say that a national bankruptcy code needs to be one of those options, at least for small
businesses. Although we do see larger, more complicated small businesses
choosing federal law in the United States, we do not know whether they
actually need federal law to solve their problems. State-law alternatives may
be adequate.17 Federal law may be chosen only when the debtor or its owners
behaved badly or were overly aggressive in bargaining with creditors. Federal
law, in other words, may give the owners of firms too much bargaining
power in times of distress.38
Then again, non-bankruptcy procedures may be incapable of dealing with
particular kinds of problems facing distressed businesses, such as fraud committed by insiders or the difficulty of reorganizing a business with operations
in many different states and countries. It is undoubtedly true that large, publicly-traded corporations need a formal bankruptcy code for just these reasons. But it is less clear that a code is needed for smaller businesses. If anything, this discussion points to the value of additional empirical research that
can identify the particular kinds of businesses that need a bankruptcy code.

37 We could, therefore, consider reforms that give the states greater authority to regulate
the bankruptcy of small businesses in the United States. Such reforms are explored in
id., at 59-60, and David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and
CorporateBankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471, 545-52 (1994).
38 Among small businesses, this may be the primary effect of Chapter 11. See Douglas G.
Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneursand Small Business Bankruptcies,
105 Colum. L. Rev. 2310 (2005).

